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(57)	 ABSTRACT
A device is disclosed in one embodiment that has multiple
identical sets of programmable functional elements, pro-
grammable routing resources, and majority voters that correct
errors. The voters accept a mode input for a redundancy mode
and a split mode. In the redundancy mode, the programmable
functional elements are identical and are programmed iden-
tically so the voters produce an output corresponding to the
majority of inputs that agree. In a split mode, each voter
selects a particular programmable functional element output
as the output of the voter. Therefore, in the split mode, the
programmable functional elements can perform different
functions, operate independently, and/or be connected
together to process different parts of the same problem.
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METHODS AND CIRCUITRY FOR	 assurance of reliable operation. However, many applications
RECONFIGURABLE SEU/SET TOLERANCE	 only need to be partly protected from SEU/SET and would
preferably also permit high capacity if possible. Capacity, the
The invention described herein was made by employee(s) 	 amount of data flow per unit of time and/or the total algorith-
of the United States Government and may be manufactured s mic complexity, is reduced in proportion to the amount of
and used by or for the Government of the United States of 	 redundancy utilized. Redundancy is usually provided as 2x or
America for governmental purposes without the payment of
	 3x, where 2x redundancy may require two data flow lines and
any royalties thereon or therefore.	 3x redundancy may require three data flow lines. For
example, SEU mitigation of logic circuits may be accom-
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
	
	 io plished by implementing triple modular redundancy (TMR)
and other techniques. However, economical alternatives to
1. Field of the Invention	 TMR have long been sought.
The present invention relates generally to circuitry which 	 Large-capacity, high-performance reprogrammable
may be operated in environments whereby the circuitry is 	 FPGAs marketed for use in space, and having latch up and
subject to single event upsets (SEU) and/or single event tran-  15 total dose hardness, but without built in SEU/SET tolerance,
sients (SET) and, more specifically, to circuitry which is	 have required designers to program SEU/SET mitigation into
reconfigurable for adjusting the SEU/SET tolerance thereof. 	 the FPGA as part of the application. Having the SEU/SET
2. Description of Related Art	 mitigation under user control allows partitioning of a design
The Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is a type of	 into protected and unprotected sections. However, there are
programmable logic device (PLD). The FPGA may comprise 20 many papers on the pitfalls of taking an FPGA and program-
an array of programmable tiles or programmable functional 	 ming SEU/SET by adding redundancy through the firmware
elements such as, for example, input/output blocks (IOBs), 	 programming. Some problems can be very subtle. For
configurable logic blocks (CLBs), look up tables (LUTs), 	 example, there may be some underlying common source of
dedicated random access memory blocks (BRAM), multipli- 	 error that is unknown due to the underlying structure of the
ers, digital signal processing blocks (DSPs), processors, 25 chip. Moreover, the circuitry is expensive to test due to the
clock managers, delay lock loops (DLLs), multi-gigabit	 requirement for testing within an environment with sufficient
transceivers (MGTs), and/or the like. 	 radiation to cause errors.
Another type of PLD is the complex programmable logic 	 As an alternative to hardware techniques, redundancy may
device, or CPLD. A CPLD may include two or moreprogram- 	 be provided via the software programming of the device,
mable functional elements connected together and also con- 3o rather than in pre-wired hardware. However, software pro-
nected to input/output (I/O) resources by an interconnect 	 gramming techniques may be less efficient, may take more
switch matrix. Each programmable function block of the	 time, and may intrude upon the application design. Typically,
CPLD may include a two-level AND/OR structure similar to 	 hardware redundancy has the advantage of being transparent
those used in programmable logic arrays (PLAs) and pro- 	 to the application.
grammable array logic (PAL) devices. In some CPLDs, con-  35 For SRAM-based FPGAs having their configuration stored
figuration data may be stored on-chip in non-volatile 	 in SEU susceptible SRAM, SEU mitigation requires protect-
memory. In other CPLDs, configuration data may be stored	 ing the configuration memory from the accumulation and
off-chip in non-volatile memory, and then downloaded to 	 indefinite retention of errors, usually by scrubbing. One pur-
volatile memory as part of an initial configuration sequence. 	 pose of scrubbing is that it protects the TMR mechanism,
The above paragraphs describe a non-limiting list of vari-  40 which would eventually fail due to multiple errors accumu-
ous types of PLDs. PLDs may be utilized to form the elec- 	 lating over time and affecting multiple voting domains. With-
tronic circuits for many different types of applications. A	 out TMR, scrubbing reduces the time period (potentially
non-limiting list of applications may comprise telecommuni-	 indefinite) during which the device is functioning errone-
cations, networking, consumer, automotive, industrial appli- 	 ously.
cations, signal processing, LiDAR, image processing for 45	 SEU/SET tolerances may be quantified in terms of error
crew display, pattern recognition, and the like. Future devices 	 rates. Error rates from SEU/SET are often expressed as errors
which utilize the present invention may be based on other 	 per bit-day. What constitutes a "lower" or "higher" SEU/SET
technologies such as nanotechnologies	 tolerance is highly dependent on a subject environment.
There is a growing use of PLDs in applications subject to 	 Stated otherwise, the error rate for a particular device will be
radiation and/or other interference which may cause a single 5o a function of the environment in which it is operated, includ-
event upset (SEU) and single event transient (SET). For 	 ing the total amount of radiation, and the composition (e.g.
example, FPGAs are being utilized more often in space and	 protons, heavy ions, etc.) and energy of that radiation. Each
military applications. Accordingly, there is an increasing	 type of radiation particle, at a specific energy, deposits a
need for efficient SEU/SET mitigation techniques. 	 characteristic amount of energy per unit length of travel
SEU/SET mitigation methods for PLD circuits fall into 55 through silicon. This is called Linear Energy Transfer (LET),
two broad groups: manufacturer designed built-in circuit	 measured in units such as McV•cm2/mg (energy lost by the
techniques and end-user designed firmware techniques. 	 particle to the material per unit path length MeV/cm divided
Built-in circuit techniques canbe utilized to more quickly and	 by the density of the material mg/cm3). In ground tests using
more reliably provide SEU/SET mitigation. End-user	 particle accelerators, circuits are characterized by the upset
designed techniques can be used to provide tailor made solu-  6o rate for a given particle flux at a given LET. Using models of
tions which are more efficient with higher data capacity but 	 radiation in various environments, such as Low Earth Orbit or
may be less reliable due to greater difficulty in providing 	 Deep Space, error rates can be estimated from the test data.
reliable SEU/SET mitigation.	 Occasionally data is directly obtained by placing test speci-
Thus, presently available devices are normally committed 	 mens in Low Earth Orbit, but rarely in other instances due to
to a fixed SEU/SET mitigation configuration, i.e., the entire 65 impracticality. What constitutes an "acceptable" error rate is
device is either redundant or is not redundant. Built-in redun- 	 heavily dependent on, for example, the application; the dura-
dancy in the hardware provides high performance and greater 	 tion of use of the application; the size of the application; the
US 7,859,292 B1
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	criticality of the application; and the radiation environment. 	 fault tolerance functions that require bit-for-bit exactness, the
	
Errors per bit-day multiplied by the total number of bits in an	 FPGA engine is programmed to tolerate faults that cannot be
	
application (including configuration bits if it is a PLD) give an	 detected through direct comparison of module outputs. Com-
	
estimate of aggregate error rate for the application. The 	 bating these faults requires more complex algorithmic or
inverse of error rate is Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF). 5 heuristic approaches that check whether outputs meet user-
	
As an example, if an application is designated as "safety or	 defined reasonableness criteria. For example, forming a
	
mission critical," and should not experience an error, then	 majority from outputs that are not identical but may nonethe-
	
MTBF should be much larger than the period of use of the	 less be correct requires taking an inexact vote. The FPGA
	
application. Critical applications might be used only for sec- 	 engine's flexibility extends to allowing for multiprocessing
onds, as when a thruster is firing, or for the entire life of a io among the modules where the FPGA engine supports mes-
	
multi-year deep-space mission, such as a human mission to 	 sage passing. Implementing these functions in hardware
	
Mars. If a 99.9999% probability of success is desired, then the 	 instead of software makes them execute faster. The FPGA is
	
MTBF would need to be 1000000 times the period of use. But 	 reprogrammable, and only the functions required immedi-
	
for a non critical application, the MTBF might be far less than 	 ately need be implemented. Inactive functions are stored
the period of use, according to the number of errors that were 15 externally in a Read-Only Memory (ROM). The dynamically
	
considered tolerable (i.e., a SEU/SET tolerance). When con- 	 reconfigurable FPGA gives the fault-tolerant system an out-
	
sidering generally the difference between protected (also 	 put stage that offers low gate complexity by storing the
	
called mitigated) and unprotected (non-critical) applications, 	 unused "gates" as configuration code in ROM. Lower gate
	
many orders of magnitude difference in error rates are 	 complexity translates to a highly reliable output stage, pre-
implied, with the protected application having an MTBF 2o requisite to a fault tolerant system.
	
similar to or much greater than the period of use, and the 	 U.S. Pat. No. 7,124,347, to W. Plants, issued Oct. 17, 2006,
	
unprotected application (or one protected by other means) 	 discloses a method for detecting an error in data stored in
having an MTBF lower than the period of use. 	 configuration SRAM and user assignable SRAM in a FPGA
	
The following patents describe some of the efforts made in 	 comprises providing serial data stream into the FPGA from an
the field of SEU/SET error mitigation:	 25 external source, loading data from the serial data stream into
	
U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,250,786 and 7,250,786, to S. Trimberger, 	 the configuration SRAM in response to address signals gen-
	
issued Jul. 31, 2007 and Sep. 4, 2007, respectively, disclose a	 erated by row column counters, loading data from the serial
	
method and apparatus to provide triple modular redundancy 	 data stream into the user assignable SRAM in response to
	
(TMR) in one mode of operation, while providing multiple 	 address signals generated by row and column: counters, load-
context selection during a second mode of operation. Intelli- 30 ing a seed and signature from the serial data stream into a
	
gent voting circuitry facilitates both modes of operation, 	 cyclic redundancy checking circuit, cycling data out of con-
	
while further enhancing the robustness of the design when	 figuration SRAM and user assignable SRAM by the row and
	
used in a TMR mode of operation. Various addressing 	 column counters, performing error checking on the data that
	
schemes are provided, which allow dual use of the configu- 	 has been cycled out of the configuration SRAM and out of the
ration data lines as selection signals using one addressing 35 user assignable SRAM by the cyclic redundancy checking
	
scheme, while allowing for dual use of the configuration	 circuit, and generating an error signal when an error is
	
address lines as selection signals using the second addressing 	 detected by the error checking circuit.
scheme.	 U.S. Pat. No. 6,963,217, to Samudrala et al., issued Nov. 8,
	
U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,310,759 and 7,512,871, to Carmichael et 	 2005, discloses a method for reducing circuit sensitivity to
al., issued Dec. 18, 2007 and Mar. 31, 2009, respectively, 40 single event upsets in programmable logic devices. The
	
disclose SEU mitigation, detection, and correction tech-	 method involves identifying single event upset sensitive gates
	
niques. Mitigation techniques include: triple redundancy of a 	 within a single event upset sensitive sub-circuit of a program-
	
logic path extended the length of the FPGA; triple logic 	 mable logic device as determined by the input environment
	
module and feedback redundancy provides redundant voter 	 and introducing triple modular redundancy and voter circuits
circuits at redundant logic outputs and voter circuits in feed- 45 for each single event upset sensitive sub-circuit so identified.
	
back loops; enhanced triple device redundancy using three 	 U.S. Pat. No. 7,200,822, to K. McElwain, issued Apr. 3,
	
FPGAs is introduced to provide nine instances of the user's 	 2007, discloses digital circuits with time multiplexed redun-
	
logic; critical redundant outputs are wire-ANDed together; 	 dancy and methods and apparatuses for their automated
	
redundant dual port RAMS, with one port dedicated to 	 designs generated from single-channel circuit designs. A
refreshing data; and redundant clock delay locked loops 5o digital circuit detects or corrects transitory upsets through
	
(DLL) are monitored and reset if each DLL does not remain 	 time-multiplexed resource sharing. Time-multiplexed
	
in phase with the majority of the DLLs. Detection techniques	 resource sharing is used to reduce the die area for implement-
	
include: configuration memory readback wherein a check- 	 ing modular redundancy. This patent also discloses automati-
	
sum is verified; separate FPGAs perform readbacks of con- 	 cally synthesizing multi-channel hardware for time-multi-
figuration memory of a neighbor FPGA; and an FPGA per- 55 plexed resource sharing by automatically generating a time-
	
forms a self-readback of its configuration memory array. 	 multiplexed design of multi-channel circuits from the design
	
Correction techniques include reconfiguration of partial con- 	 of a single-channel circuit, in which at least a portion of the
	
figuration data and "scrubbing" based on anticipated SEUs.	 channels are allocated for modular redundancy.
	
U.S. Pat. No. 5,931,959, to K. Kwiat, issued Aug. 3, 1999, 	 The above approaches do not solve the aforementioned
discloses computing modules which can cooperate to tolerate 60 problems. The complexity and difficulty of end-user-de-
	
faults among their members. In a preferred embodiment,	 signed mitigation is encountered over and over through the
	
computing modules couple with dual-ported memories and
	
life cycle of the application. Ideally the application could
	
interface with a dynamically reconfigurable Field-Program- 	 assume the hardware was performing correctly by means of
	
mable Gate Array ("FPGA"). The FPGA serves as a compu- 	 redundancy built in to the hardware. However because some
tational engine to provide direct hardware support for flexible 65 applications, such as signal processing, may better handle
	
fault tolerance between unconstrained combinations of the 	 errors through their existing protocol techniques, it would be
	
computing modules. In addition to supporting traditional
	
desirable to be able to select capacity over redundancy.
US 7,859,292 B1
5	 6
Those of skill in the art will appreciate the present inven- 	 blocks to prevent a single SEU/SET causing an error in any
tion that addresses the above and other problems. 	 two of said plurality of blocks at the same time.
In another embodiment, a method for making a reconfig-
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION	 urable programmable integrated circuit may comprise steps
s such as providing a plurality of programmable functional
An object of the present invention is to provide improved 	 elements on a reconfigurable programmable integrated cir-
SEU/SET resistant circuitry. 	 cuit, providing a at least one programmable interconnection
Another possible object of the present invention is to pro- 	 between the programmable functional elements, and provid-
vide a reconfigurable level of redundancy in the hardware. 	 ing a mode control with a redundant mode of operation and a
Another possible object of the present invention is to io split channel mode of operation. As a practical matter inmost
enable a TMR, FPGA, or similar device to be reconfigured in	 cases, but perhaps not all, there will be many possible pro-
whole or part to provide higher capacity in a non-redundant 	 grammable interconnections available for the designer of an
operating mode.	 application. In the redundant mode of operation, the program-
Another possible object of the present invention is to 	 mable functional elements produce outputs which are major-
enable users with the ability to choose increased data flow 15 ity voted. In the split channel mode of operation, the program-
capacity over redundancy in an integrated circuit. 	 mable functional elements produce outputs which are not
Another possible advantage of the present invention is that	 majority voted.
built-in hardware redundancy attendant speed and ease of 	 In another embodiment of the invention, reconfigurable
design can be utilized without giving up high capacity for 	 programmable circuitry is provided that may comprise a plu-
other parts of an application. 	 2o rality of programmable functional elements and a mode con-
However, it will be understood that the above-listed objec- 	 trol for adjusting a SEU/SET tolerance or plurality of SEU/
tives and/or advantages of the invention are intended only as	 SET tolerances whereby in a first mode of operation the
an aid in quickly understanding aspects of the invention, are	 electronic circuits formed by the programmable functional
not intended to limit the invention in any way, and therefore	 elements have a first SEU/SET tolerance comprised of a
do not form a comprehensive or restrictive list of objectives, 25 relatively lower SEU/SET tolerance and in a second mode of
and/or features, and/or advantages.	 operation they have a second SEU/SET tolerance comprised
Accordingly, one embodiment of the invention provides a 	 of a relatively higher SEU/SET tolerance wherein the relative
reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit which may 	 nature of the SEU/SET tolerance is based on comparison
comprise a plurality of programmable functional elements,	 between the first and second SEU/SET tolerances or between
programmable interconnections for the programmable func- 30 each of the plurality of tolerances.
tional elements, and a mode control operably connected with	 In one embodiment, in the first mode of operation, the
the programmable functional elements. In a redundant mode 	 programmable functional elements can be programmed dif-
of operation, the programmable functional elements produce	 ferently and can perform different functions. In the second
an output which is voted. In a split channel mode of operation,	 mode of operation, the programmable functional elements
the programmable functional elements produce an output 35 are programmed identically to operate in a triple redundant
which is not voted.	 mode of operation.
The programmable functional elements may be organized 	 The plurality ofprogrammable functional elements may be
into a plurality of blocks, which may each be physically 	 organized into a plurality of blocks which may be on the same
positioned on an integrated circuit. In this embodiment, each 	 integrated circuit or on different integrated circuits or part of
block is preferably sufficiently physically separated from oth- 40 other circuitry. In any case, each block is sufficiently physi-
ers of the plurality of blocks to prevent a single SEU/SET 	 cally separated from others of the plurality of blocks, or is
causing an error in two blocks at the same time. 	 sufficiently otherwise radiation hardened, to prevent a single
The reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit may	 SEU/SET causing an error in two blocks at the same time.
also comprise a plurality of voters electrically connected to 	 in one embodiment, the reconfigurable programmable cir-
the programmable functional elements. In one embodiment, 45 cuitry may comprise a plurality of voters electrically con-
the plurality of voters is connected to provide a triple redun- 	 nected to the plurality of programmable functional elements.
dant mode of operation.	 In the second mode of operation, the plurality of voters is
The reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit may	 connected to provide the triple redundant mode of operation.
further comprise pre-wired electrical continuous connections 	 In another embodiment, a method is provided for making
without switches between the plurality of voters in the plu-  50 programmable circuitry, which may comprise steps such as
rality of different blocks. 	 forming a plurality of programmable functional elements,
The reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit may	 and providing a mode control for the programmable func-
further comprise switchable connections between the blocks 	 tional elements for adjusting an SEU/SET tolerance thereof.
where each of the switchable connections between the plu- 	 In a first mode of operation, the electronic circuits of the
rality of blocks may comprise at least two switches. In one 55 programmable functional elements have a relatively lower
embodiment, the two switches are sufficiently physically 	 SEU/SET tolerance. In a second mode of operation, they have
separated from each other to prevent a single SEU/SET caus- 	 a relatively higher SEU/SET tolerance.
ing an error in both switches at the same time. 	 The method may comprise organizing the plurality of pro-
The reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit may	 grammable functional elements into a plurality of blocks, and
also comprise a plurality of programmable functional ele- 60 providing that each block is sufficiently physically separated
ments operable to be programmed to form at least one elec- 	 from others of the plurality of blocks to prevent a single
tronic circuit and a programmable routing network operably	 SEU/SET causing an error in two blocks at the same time. A
connected to the programmable functional elements, wherein 	 plurality of voters may be electrically connected to the pro-
said plurality of programmable functional elements and said 	 grammable functional elements to provide a triple redundant
programmable routing network are organized into a plurality 65 mode of operation as the second mode of operation.
of blocks, wherein each of said plurality of blocks are suffi- 	 In another embodiment, a reconfigurable programmable
ciently physically separated from others of said plurality of
	
integrated circuit may comprise a plurality of programmable
US 7,859,292 B1
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functional elements which process data, a plurality of mode
controlled voters, and a mode control, wherein the voter out-
put is responsive to the mode control with a first mode of
operation and a second mode of operation. In the first mode of
operation each voter output is responsive to only one of the
respective outputs of the programmable functional elements.
In the second mode of operation, the voter output is respon-
sive to a majority of the respective outputs of the program-
mable functional elements.
The mode controlled voters may be connected together in
groups of three, whereby in the second mode of operation the
three mode controlled voters produce three voter outputs.
In yet another embodiment a method for making a recon-
figurable programmable integrated circuit may comprise pro-
viding a plurality of programmable functional elements, and
connecting the respective outputs of the plurality of program-
mable functional elements to a plurality of mode controlled
voters. In a first mode of operation, operation each voter
output is responsive to only one of the respective outputs. In
a second mode of operation, the voter output is responsive to
a majority of the respective outputs of the plurality of pro-
grammable functional elements.
In another embodiment, a reconfigurable programmable
integrated circuit may comprise a plurality of programmable
functional elements and a plurality of programmable inter-
connections for the plurality of programmable functional ele-
ments. The plurality of programmable interconnections may
be organized into a plurality of blocks. Each block may be
sufficiently physically separated from others of the plurality
of blocks to prevent a single SEU/SET causing an error in two
blocks at the same time.
The reconfigurable programmable integrated circuit may
further comprise switchable connections between the plural-
ity of blocks wherein each of the switchable connections
comprise at least two switches. The two switches are suffi-
ciently physically separated from each other to prevent a
single SEU/SET causing an error in both switches at the same
time.
At least two configuration bits may be utilized for control-
ling the two switches. The circuitry for the two configuration
bits is sufficiently physically separated to prevent a single
SEU/SET causing an error in the at least two switches at the
same time.
In another embodiment, a method for making a reconfig-
urable programmable integrated circuit may comprise pro-
viding a plurality of programmable functional elements, pro-
viding a plurality of programmable interconnections for the
programmable functional elements, and organizing the pro-
grammable functional elements and the programmable inter-
connections into a plurality of blocks such that each block is
sufficiently physically separated from other blocks to prevent
a single SEU/SET causing an error in two blocks at the same
time.
Other steps may comprise providing that all switchable
connections between the blocks comprise at least two
switches wherein each of the two switches connect to an
associated intermediate line, which connects between two
blocks. The method may further comprise physically separat-
ing the two switches sufficiently from each other to prevent a
single SEU/SET causing an error in both switches at the same
time.
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is an electronic schematic block diagram of a PLD
which permits reconfiguration of the SEU/SET tolerance in
5 accord with one possible embodiment of the present inven-
tion;
FIG. 2 is another electronic schematic block diagram of a
PLD which permits reconfiguration of the SEU/SET toler-
10 ance showing a plurality of configuration bits and a plurality
of programmable interconnections in accord with one pos-
sible embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a generalized electronic schematic block diagram
of a PLD which permits reconfiguration of the SEU/SET
15 tolerance in accord with one possible embodiment of the
present invention;
FIG. 4A is an electronic schematic diagram which shows a
voter with mode control which may utilize outputs of pro-
20 grammable function elements and/or configuration memory
in accord with one possible embodiment of the present inven-
tion;
FIG. 4B is a more detailed electronic schematic diagram of
one possible non-limiting configuration of the voter of FIG.
25 4A in accord with one possible embodiment of the present
invention;
FIG. 4C is a truth table of inputs and outputs of the voter of
FIG. 4A in accord with one possible embodiment of the
30 present invention;
FIG. 5 is an electronic schematic diagram which shows
possible details of local and global programmable routing
(PR) networks which provide a plurality of programmable
interconnections controlled by a plurality of configuration
35 bits in accord with one possible embodiment of the present
invention.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED
EMBODIMENTS
40
One embodiment of the present invention enables recon-
figuration of SEU/SET tolerance in selective physical loca-
tions within programmable logic devices (PLDs). For
45 example, circuitry internal to an integrated circuit may be
selectively reconfigured for either redundant or non-redun-
dant operation. In this way, the application can be tailor made
for the right mix of reliability and high capacity. The present
invention can be utilized to provide more quickly designed,
50 reliable firmware redundancy where needed, while permit-
ting other areas of integrated circuits to operate in a single
channel mode of operation having high data capacity.
Even incorporating the dual mode of operation capability,
the device may retain up to 95% of the capacity, or possibly
55 more, as compared with a device that does not utilize pre-
wired redundant operation. In accord with the present inven-
tion, developers can design hardware redundancy into appli-
cations without encountering the many pitfalls of attempting
60 to design redundancy into circuitry which may otherwise be
used for single channel operation.
Referring now to the drawings, and more particularly to
FIG. 1, there is shown a programmable logic device (PLD) 10
with reconfigurable SEU/SET tolerance in accord with one
65 possible embodiment of the present invention. An electronic
circuit with a higher SEU/SET tolerance produces fewer
uncorrected errors than an electronic circuit with a lower
US 7,859,292 B1
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SEU/SET tolerance when operated in an environment bom- 	 connections controlled by a plurality of configuration bits as
barded by radiation particles that produce SEU/SETS. 	 discussed in more detail hereinafter.
FIG.1 shows one possible "configurable reliability block"	 Referring again to FIG. 1, outputs of the voters 20 -25 are
CRB 12. CRB 12 may represent one integrated circuit chip, or 	 shown connected to corresponding local programmable rout-
there could be a number of CRBs on a single chip. The 5 ing (PR) networks A, B, and C, as indicated at 26, 28 and 30.
smallest CRB determines the granularity at which the choice	 A "routing network" may be comprised of a plurality of PR
between TMR and split mode can be made.	 networks. Local PR networks can be utilized to reconfigure
While the present invention does not need to be laid out 	 the routing of signals between TMR operation and single
physically as shown in FIG. 1, an integrated circuit con-	 channel or split mode operation. More details of PR networks
structed in accord with the present invention may be laid out io of programmable switches which allow the routing to be
in blocks which are physically segregated from each other as 	 programmed for a particular desired electronic circuit appli-
indicated in FIG. 1, for reasons discussed hereinafter. As well, 	 cation are discussed in connection with FIG. 5.
"blocks" as used herein, may also refer to circuitry which is 	 In FIG. 1, voter output 76 of voter 20 is connected to local
physically set apart by some means, and may include being 	 PR networkA. The same is true of voter output 78 of voter 21.
positioned on different integrated circuits, at different loca- 15 In TMR mode of operation, this output may be utilized as
tions on the same integrated circuit, or being positioned in 	 feedback to correct errors in PF elements 70 and 71. In split-
other circuitry. However, the present invention may also be	 mode or single channel operation, outputs 76 and 78 are
utilized in integrated circuits that are not separated into 	 directed by local PR A routing network as desired for the
blocks.	 particular application.
In this embodiment of CRB 12, there are three voting 20	 Mode controls 31, 33, and 35 are utilized to control the
domains, A, B and C, indicated at 14,16, and 18. Each voting	 mode of operation of CRB 12. In this example, three mode
domain has an arbitrary number of programmable function 	 controls are shown for redundancy. However, this is not the
elements (PF) as indicated by the use of an ellipsis. For 	 only possible way the mode controls could be protected and
example, voting domain A may include any number of PF	 implemented.
elements, such as PF elements 70 and 71. Voting domain B 25 To the extent that the PF elements comprise memory, such
may include any number of PF elements, such as PF elements 	 as configuration memory 83 shown in FIG. 2, some method
72 and 73. Likewise, voting domain C may include any num-	 has to be provided to detect and remove errors in the configu-
ber of PF elements, such as PF elements 74 and 75.	 ration memory, or to make the configuration memory error
In FIG. 1, PF elements 70, 72, and 74 are connected to the 	 proof. Both approaches exist in the prior art, namely scrub-
same voters, 20, 22, and 24. In the figures, when connection so bing for SRAM, or TMR for SRAM, or the use of FLASH or
lines cross over one another, such "cross-overs" do not indi-	 ANTIFUSE, which makes the configuration memory hard-
cate a connection unless illustrated with a dot. For example,	 ened against SEU/SET.
the connection line from PF element 72 to voter element 22 	 Examples of PF elements are discussed hereinbefore in the
includes a dot over the intersection with a connection line that	 background section and may comprise those listed, or com-
originates from PF element 64 and ultimately connects to 35 binations of those, or other programmable elements not pre-
voter elements 20 and 24. Thus, FIG.1 is interpreted such that 	 viously listed. Input/output may be part of the PF elements
PF element 72 is operably connected to voter elements 20 and	 and/or part of the programmable routing networks.
24 in addition to voter element 22. In direct contrast, PF 	 If any of the PF elements are a type with internal state
element 72 is not operably connected to voter elements 21, 	 memory, such as BRAM or CPU elements, then these must
23, and 25 because there are no dots associated with the 4o have additional SEU/SET protection, as discussed below.
connection line that extends from PE element 72 to voter 	 Ordinary configurable logic blocks (CLB) and digital signal
element 22 wherein this connection line intersects with con- 	 processing (DSP) type PF elements should be fully protected
nection lines that are associated with voter elements 21, 23, 	 by the invention.
and 25.	 For operation with a triple modular redundancy (TMR)
PF elements 71, 73, and 75 are connected to the same 45 type of SEU/SET tolerance, the three voting domains A, B,
voters 21, 23, and 25. PF elements 70, 72, and 74 are not	 and C are programmed identically. For use in a TMR mode,
connected to voters 21, 23, and 25. Likewise PF elements 71, 	 identical signals (assuming no SEU/SET) from the three PF
73, and 75 are not connected to voters 20, 22, and 24. Thus, if 	 elements are voted using groups of voters. For instance, in the
voting domains A, B, and C are physically segregated and/or	 example of FIG. 1, PF elements 70, 72 and 74 are majority
otherwise constructed to so that a single particle does not 50 voted using voters 20, 22, and 24. PF elements 71, 72, and 73
cause a SEU/SET in two domains at the same time, then TMR 	 are majority voted using voters 21, 23, and 25. Any number of
will provide reliable data flow through electronic circuit, 	 PF elements and associated voters may be utilized.
which the PF elements are programmed to provide. In one 	 In one embodiment, when CRB 12 is implemented as part
embodiment, pre-wired non-switchable connections are uti- 	 of a single integrated circuit, the three voting domains A, B,
lized between the voters, as indicated at 79 and 81. 	 55 and C are physically segregated on the integrated circuit
Another view of a reconfigurable integrated circuit in 	 sufficiently to avoid the spread of an SEU/SET caused by a
accord with the invention is shown with a different schematic 	 single particle from producing simultaneous errors in two
layout in FIG. 2. FIG. 2 shows three hardware identical PF	 voting domains. In other words, the components of each
elements, such as PF element 87, connected to three voters, 	 voting domain are physically separated from components of
88, 92, and 90. In FIG. 2, the dot-dash line surrounding 6o another voting domain by a distance greater than the likely
components 83, 84, and 86 represent PF element 87 because	 spread distance of an SET or SEU.
PF 87 may be considered to comprise these components. PF 	 The likely spread distance of an SEU/SET may be deter-
elements may include various elements. For example, in this 	 mined for a particular technology by testing a circuit using a
example PF element 87 comprises configuration memory 83,	 cyclotron wherein heavy ions strike the device at various
configurable logic block (CLB) 84 and flip/flop 86. Thus, 65 angles. For bulk silicon, it appears to the inventor that utiliz-
FIG. 2 shows the PF elements therein in more detail than in	 ing one micron as being "not near" would result in very rare,
FIG. 1. FIG. 2 also shows a plurality of programmable inter- 	 if any, hits that would cause errors in two voting domains at
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the same time. In other words, separating the voting domains
by this distance in chips using bulk silicon would be effective
to prevent a single SEU/SET causing an error in any two
blocks at the same time.
The inventor has tested a TMR circuit in a chip with com- 5
ponents spaced at 0.35 microns wherein the chip is built
without regard to adjacency, and found zero errors even with
the most energetic particles from a cyclotron. However, the
same TMR circuit evaluated with a component spacing of
0.1 S microns produced a few errors, though still well within io
an acceptable range. Circuits are currently being made with
0.045 micron component spacings, and most FPGAs are
being made with 0.065 micron component spacings. Accord-
ingly, it is believed that further deterioration of TMR perfor-
mance may possibly occur in the future which can be avoided 15
if the chips are built in accord with steps presented herein.
However, the selective control of SEU/SET tolerance in
accord with the present invention may be utilized in many
circuits without regard to special integrated circuit compo-
nent spacings and arrangements. 	 20
"Near" for this purpose means the "likely spread distance
of an SET or SEU" in whatever chip technology is used.
Therefore, "not near" means greater than "the likely spread
distance of an SET or SEU." This distance is usually, but not
necessarily, in the micron range. Depending on the type of 25
technology the offset between voting domain switches may
be of different values, e.g., greater or less than 0.5 microns, 1
micron, 3 microns, 4 microns, or 5 microns, and the like. In
different technologies, the "likely spread distance of an SET
or SEU" between local routing switches may be different, 30
e.g., greater or less than 10 microns, etc. In other words, the
likely spread distance of an SET or SEU is dependent on the
technology. Moreover, with changing technologies and
decreasing distances between components, the meaning of
"near" or "likely spread distance of an SET or SEU" may 35
change. "Likely" may be a probability of less than 90%, or
less than 95%, or less than 99.99% or less than 99.99999%, or
the like.
An error must occur in more than one voting domain to
affect the result.Thus, the present invention maybe laid out in 40
physical blocks that are "not near", as that term is defined as
above. Although various blocks are shown in FIG. 1, the
physical layout of the blocks may be different from that
shown in FIG. 1, and may include subdivided blocks within
each block, as desired. For example, CRB 12 may be a 45
"block" that is "not near" other CRBs, and may include other
"blocks" therein, which are "not near" each other, such as
voting domains A, B, and C. Moreover, global PR block 32
might be subdivided into blocks that are "not near" each other.
The physical layout of an integrated circuit can be an impor- 50
tant consideration of one possible embodiment of the present
invention. However, the present invention can be utilized in
many integrated circuits without special layout consider-
ations.
In one embodiment, errors are unlikely to propagate to 55
more than one of the voting domains A, B, and C due to
SEU/SET errors caused in the switches of switchable inter-
connections between voting domains A, B, and C because all
the switchable interconnections between the voting domains
preferably utilize at least two switches that are "not near" 60
each other. It is unlikely that such switches will be affected by
the same SEU/SET. By "not near," as discussed above, it is
meant that the switches are separated by a distance greater
than the likely spread distance of an SET or SEU in order to
maintain a desired acceptable fault tolerance of CRB 12. 	 65
CRB 12 can be connected to other CRB blocks in TMR
mode, or to CRB blocks running in split mode with the option
12
for multiple single channels. If connected to split mode
blocks, the user is accepting the possibility of errors from the
split mode blocks getting into the TMR block. Such errors
may include data errors for which the application designer
has another plan to handle, such as data averaging or error
correction protocols.
To operate multiple blocks in TMR mode requires reliable
communication internally within each block as well as
between blocks in an environment subject to SEU/SET.
Accordingly, one embodiment of the present invention may
comprise local A, B and C programmable routing (PR) net-
works as shown by the embodiment of FIG. 1. Local pro-
grammable routing (PR) networks A, B, and C, as shown at
26,28 and 30, maybe utilized for communications internally
within voting domains A, B and C, respectively. By local, it is
meant, for example, that local programmable routing network
A is utilized to provide routing exclusively or almost exclu-
sively within voting domain A. Moreover, local program-
mable routing network A may preferably be physically
located within the region of the chip which is designated for
voting domain A or is preferably at least physically segre-
gated so as to be "not near" to voting domains B and C, or
local programmable routing networks B and C. Thus, refer-
ring to FIG. 1, a single SEU/SET that affects, for example,
local PR network A switches, does not also affect voting
domains B and C.
Routing within a voting section (A, B, C) has no constraint,
other than that it be co-located with other elements of the
same section, and "not near" a different section in the same
voting group. Routing between voting sections, for example,
from voting domain A to voting domain B, must follow the
constraint that there be at least two switches and two configu-
ration bits controlling those switches, and that those items be
located "not near" each other. The configuration bits are dis-
cussed hereinafter. This condition may be satisfied by placing
one configuration bit-switch pair within voting domainA and
one within voting domain B, but also possibly in other ways.
For a TMR operation mode, local PR networks A, B, and C
would need to be extended to connect with local PR networks
A, B and C of other CRBs (not shown). In one possible
embodiment, such connections may be made though global
PR network 32, as indicated by connections 27, 29, and 37. In
another possible embodiment, connections may be made
directly between voting domains A, B, and C. Rules for pre-
venting a single SEU/SET from affecting two voting domains
of global PR are discussed hereinafter. Thus, in one embodi-
ment of the invention, programmable routing networks in
accord with the present invention can be organized into global
and local programmable networks. However, the invention is
not limited to this particular organization. Moreover, depend-
ing on the embodiments, which may become complicated,
there may be exceptions to this organization of programmable
routing networks. Moreover, in some cases local program-
mable networks may communicate directly to each other
instead of through global PR network 32 in accord with the
rules discussed hereinafter, e.g., by connection through at
least two switches that are "not near" each other.
A simplified example of programmable routing organiza-
tion, referred to as routing resource 34, is shown in FIG. 5.
Routing resource 34 shows one possible embodiment of rout-
ing switches that provide partitioned safe routing.
For the sake of convention in the present application, it will
be understood that symbols for switches are shown by an
arrow, such as that indicated at numeral 38. A configuration
bit, as indicated by dashed line 58 is utilized to control the
on-off position of the particular switch. A user of the pro-
grammable circuit programs the configuration bits to control
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	the network of switches. If switch 38 is on, then a connection	 and 39 are "not near" local PR network B switches 40 and 41
	is made between the conductor at the base of the arrow, as	 or local PR network C switches 42 and 43. Likewise, local PR
	
indicated by line 26, and another conductor at the tip of the 	 network A configuration bits 58 and 59 are "not near" local
	
arrow, as indicated by vertical line 106. Then the signal is 	 PR B configuration bits 118 and 120 or local PR network C
transferred from line 26 to line 106. If switch 38 were off, then 5 configuration bits 122 and 124.
	
no connection is made to vertical line 106. In either case the	 As discussed above, the physical layout of local PR net-
	
signal continues to travel along line 26. For example, in FIG.	 work switches 38 -42 in an integrated circuit may be quite
	
5, a signal path is indicated by a darkened line 26 which	 different than the circuit diagram shown in FIG. 5. For
	
continues until reaching switch 44. Switch 44 is on, so the 	 instance, local programmable routing network  switches 38
signal switches to the path of darkened line 54 upwardly to io may be positioned on one side of an integrated circuit while
	
switch 56, which is also on. Therefore, switch 56 switches the	 local programmable routing network B switches 40 are posi-
	
signal path to the horizontal line indicated by numeral 50	 tioned on another side, and so forth.
	
from the vertical line 54 whereby the signal now ceases going 	 Shown for convenience on the right of the circuit diagram
	
upwardly and continues towards the end of the line with the 	 of routing resources 34 in FIG. 5 is a global programmable
numeral 50.	 15 routing (PR) network, which in this example may correspond
	
Shown for convenience on the left of routing resource 34 is 	 to global PR network 32, of FIG. 1. Routing resources 34
	
local routing 36 which may be utilized as local PR networks 	 provides a plurality of programmable interconnections in the
	
A, B, and C, as indicated at 26, 28, and 30 in FIG. 1, for voting	 form of a network of switches controlled by a plurality of
	
domains A, B, and C, as indicated at 14, 16, and 18 in FIG. 1. 	 configuration bits. Global PR network switches, which are
However, it will be understood that the physical layout of an 20 utilized as programmable interconnections, may have the
	
integrated circuit may be quite different than the electronic 	 same constraints discussed above. There can be any number
	
layout of schematic of FIG. 5. It will also be understood that 	 of global PR switches, conductors, and configuration bits.
	
routing resource 34 may be utilized for other purposes, such 	 Global PR network A switches 44 and 45 are "not near"
	
as providing more reliable redundancy in circuitry which is 	 global routing network B switches 46 and 47 or global routing
provided without pre-wired redundancy. 	 25 network C switches 48 and 49. Likewise, global routing net-
	
Local programmable routing network 36 may comprise	 work B switches 46 and 47 are not "near" global routing
	
any number of wires, switches, and configuration bits for each 	 network C switches 48 and 49. The same is true for the
	
voting domain such as local programmable routing groups of	 corresponding configuration bits. As an example, this condi-
	
switches 38 -43, conductors 26, 28, 30, configuration bits 80,	 tion can be easily met within this embodiment by positioning
and conductors 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116 (hereinafter 30 switches and configuration bits connecting PF or PR A ele-
	
106-116). It will be understood, for example, that switches 	 ments to the PR global routing physically within block A,
	
38-43 may represent many switches, any one of which may be 	 likewise positioning the switches and configuration bits for
	
open or closed in a given configuration based on configura- 	 connecting B and C elements to the global network within the
	
tion bits, such as voting domain A configuration bits 58 and	 blocks B and C. For higher level global routing that will be
59, which may represent many configuration bits. The orien-  35 used to connect one A voting domain to other A voting
	
tation of conductors only in the horizontal and vertical in the 	 domains, or likewise for B and C voting domains, this segre-
	
drawing provides no limitations on their orientations in a 	 gation can be maintained in like manner, by providing dedi-
	
circuit layout. Other switches, configuration bits, and con- 	 cated A, B and C regions in the system global routing for
	
ductors in FIG. 5 such as in global PR network 32 may also 	 location of routing switches. Again, the physical layout of the
represent many switches, configuration bits, and conductors. 40 global routing switches in an integrated circuit may be quite
	
In the example of FIG. 5, conductors 106-116 are shown to	 different from the circuit diagram layout shown in FIG. 5.
	
each be connecting to switches only within a particular voting	 Other switches, such as switches 56 and 57 and their corre-
	
domain A, B, or C. Thus, the switches in voting domain A, 	 sponding configuration bits, may also be segregated.
	
such as switches 38 and 39, may represent any number of 	 In one possible embodiment, as mentioned above, no vot-
switches found only within voting domain A, and lines such 45 ing domain is allowed to be connected to another voting
	
as line 26, 106, and 112 may represent any number of con- 	 domainby a single switch. While output signal 50 on theright
	
ductors found only within voting domain A. Configuration 	 of PR 32 may be connected to any voting domain A, B or C,
	
bits 58 and 59 may also represent any number of configura- 	 assume for example, that output signal 50 is connected to
	
tion bits, which may be located within voting domain A. 	 voting domain B. Therefore, a potential connection exists
These switches, configuration bits, and conductors can be 5o between voting domain A and voting domain B when the
	
utilized as local PR A to program various desired intercon- 	 connection may not be desirable depending on the mode of
	
nections within voting domain A, depending on the applica- 	 operation of the circuit. If the connection is completed by a
tion.	 single switch which is hit by an SEU/SET, this may poten-
	
Accordingly, in one possible embodiment for partitioned 	 tially affect both voting domain A and voting domain B. One
safe routing, local PR network A, as symbolized or indicated 55 rule in accord with a possible embodiment of the invention
	
at 26, 38, 39, 58, 59, 106 and 112 may only be utilized for	 requires at least two "not-near" switches to make a connec-
	
programmable connections within voting domain A. This 	 tion between voting domain A and voting domain B utilizing
	
also true for local PR network B, as symbolized or indicated 	 an intermediate link.
	
at 28,40,41, 118,120,108, and 114. The same can be said of 	 For example, in split mode operation, a connection may be
local PR network C, as indicated at 30, 42, 43, 122, 124, 110, 6o desirable through global programmable routing network
and 116.	 domain A switch 44, which is connected to intermediate link
	
The separation of local programmable routing networks, 	 54, and corresponding global programmable routing network
	
such as local PR networks A, B, and C, may increase the 	 domain B (in this case) switch 56, which is also connected to
	
SEU/SET tolerance of an integrated circuit. In one embodi- 	 intermediate link 54. Both switches 44 and 56 have to be
ment of the invention, the switches of different voting 65 closed to make this connection between voting domain A and
	
domains can be segregated to protect against the spread of a	 voting domain B. Because switches 44 and 56 are not near
	
SET or SEU. For example, local PR network A switches 38	 each other, it is unlikely that an SEU/SET would trigger both
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switches simultaneously to inadvertently produce a connec- 	 application may be far less susceptible to single event errors.
tion between voting domain A and voting domain B. 	 If done well, the circuit might have no susceptibility to single
Connecting between two different voting domains with a	 event errors. It would not have the speed and efficiency advan-
single switch would violate the separation rules in accord 	 tage of the hardware voters, of course, if they were not
with one embodiment of the invention because if one switch 5 present.
failed due to an SEU/SET then a connection between two 	 It will also be understood that although the above described
domains might inadvertently be made. Accordingly, connec-	 routing is believed to be useful for the configurable SEU/SET
tions between two different voting domains require at least 	 tolerance circuitry of the invention, other types of routing
one intermediate link or conductor, such as intermediate links 	 may be utilized. It will also be understood that routing often
52 and 54, and at least two switches. Another connection may io becomes very complicated, with wires of many lengths, and
utilize, for example, link 52 and switches 45 and 57, which are	 the like. However, in the above-described routing configura-
connected to opposite sides of link 52. As noted above, the 	 tion, it is only necessary that the rules outlined be followed.
corresponding two switches are "not near" each other and 	 For example, two switches which are not "near" each other
utilize an intermediate link to connect between two voting 	 are used with an intermediate link to make a connection
domains.	 15 between voting domains.
In the circuit diagram of FIG. 5, intermediate links 52 and 	 FIGS. 4A, 413, and 4C show examples of a possible mode
54 are shown as vertical wires, although their physical orien- 	 controlled voter 62, which may be utilized as mode controlled
tation and length is variable. Because two switches, such as	 voters 20-25 of FIG. 1. In one embodiment, signals of pro-
switches 44 and 56, are "not near" each other, they are	 grammable functional (PF) elements that process data and
unlikely to fail at the same time due to the same SEU/SET. 20 produce an output may be inputs A, B, and C to voter 62, as
One possible way of providing this separation is to locate 	 suggested in FIG. 4A. Output 64 depends upon the mode in
each switch with the voting domain it serves, identified by its 	 which mode controlled voter 62 is operating, either voted or
horizontal row. Thus, a connection is available if desired but 	 split mode. The mode of operation may also be referred to as
is not inadvertently made when it is not desired. 	 TMR operation, which is voted, or single channel, which is a
In one embodiment, the associated configuration bits 25 split mode of operation that is not voted.
which control the switches for programmable networks must	 Referring to the truth table of FIG. 4C, if the mode signal is
follow the same not-near rules. In this embodiment, the con- 	 a logic 1, then the output is the same as the majority when
figuration bits may be segregated between local program-	 there is a difference in the signals. On the other hand, if the
mable network configuration bits 80 and global program-	 mode control signal is a logic 0, then the output is the same as
mable network configuration bits 82, and may be further 30 one of the inputs. In this example, the output is always the
segregated as switches associated with voting domains A, B, 	 same as that which comes from input A. However, the output
and C. Any switches associated with configuration bits 63 and 	 of mode controlled voter 62 could be the same as any particu-
60, for example, which operate switches 56 and 44, respec-	 lar input. In other words, the output 64 of mode controlled
tively, must be "not near" each other. This tends to happen 	 voter 62 may either be voted or not voted. In this way, each
naturally if resources are physically segregated into blocks on 35 voting domain may operate independently in a separate chan-
an integrated circuit, as shown in FIG. 1. Likewise, configu- 	 nel from the other voting domains, or may be interconnected
ration bits 65 and 61, which operate switches 57 and 45,	 to operate in a TMR mode depending on the mode control.
respectively, must be "not near" each other. Furthermore, 	 FIG. 4B shows a logic circuit comprised of NAND gates
switches for configuration bits 58 and 60, which are in the	 which may be utilized to implement the truth table of FIG. 4C.
local and global networks, are "not near" each other, in at least 40 If the mode switch is set to 0, then MODEB will be 1, and the
in one possible embodiment of the invention. 	 output will always be x. If the mode switch is set to 0, then the
For TMR operation, in one embodiment, all global domain	 output with be the majority of x, y, and z. Other logic circuits
network 32 switches that would otherwise connect between	 may also be utilized to implement the truth table of FIG. 4C.
the voting domains during split operation are off. Therefore, 	 Referring to FIG. 1, mode control 31, 33, and 35 may be
at least two switches which are "not near" each other, such as 45 applied to mode controlled voters 20 -25 in triplicate. How-
switches 44 and 56, would have to fail for a fault to be 	 ever, the mode signal can be made reliable by any one of a
propagated between voting domains A and B. Since these 	 number of means. The origin of the mode control could be
switches and their configuration bits are "not near" each
	
internal or external to CFR 12. If external, the granularity (or
other, this cannot happen because a SET or SEU by hypoth-	 number of reconfigurable reliability blocks (CFR) 12) would
esis, are "single" events. 	 5o have some limit due to a pin being needed for each one. If
As indicated at 79 and 81, in FIG. 1, connections between 	 internal, the mode would presumably be made of the same
the voters provide non-switchable connections between the 	 thing as the rest of the chip's configuration memory. If the
domains. In one embodiment, these connections may be per-	 configuration memory technology is vulnerable to SET or
manently pre-wired by the manufacturer. In other words, 	 SEU, then the mode control needs to be heavily mitigated,
lands without switches may be used to connect the voters 55 since a mode error could introduce errors into the functional
together.	 results if it affected voters in different voting domains. An
In split operation, which may also be referred to as single 	 example of vulnerable configuration memory is SRAM. An
channel operation, switches in global PR network 32 may be 	 example of not vulnerable configuration memory is FLASH.
utilized to pass data between voting domains A, B, and C, 	 However, even in the case of not-vulnerable memory, SETS in
because different domains may be working on different parts 60 the connecting logic are possible. One way to make the mode
of the same problem.	 line SEU/SET tolerant is to triplicate it along with everything
The routing scheme shown in FIG. 5 may be utilized with- 	 else. However, the mode control does not necessarily need to
out the hardware voting scheme shown in FIG. 1. For 	 be voted. For example, it may simply be provided in triplicate.
example, if a conventional FPGA used routing physically 	 If the configuration memory is vulnerable, then both the
partitioned in this way on the integrated circuit, along with 65 memory and the connecting logic should be triplicated. In one
firmware TMR, and the tools constructing the firmware TMR 	 embodiment, the present invention assumes there will be
took advantage of the physical partitioning, then the resulting	 separate configuration memory for everything in separate
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voting domains, including the mode control. The mode con-
trol may or may not be designed to be changed during opera-
tion.
Referring to FIG. 2, there is shown another electronic block
diagram of PLD 10 that may be utilized to describe an
embodiment of the present invention. PLD 10 may comprise
three (or many more) programmable function (PF) elements,
wherein each PF element might comprise a configurable logic
block, flip/flop, and configuration memory ormight comprise
other elements. The dot-dash line at 87 encircles the compo-
nents for PF element 87. In this example, a first PF element 87
may comprise configuration memory 83, control logic block
84, and flip/flop 86. The output of this PF element 87 goes to
three voters 88, 90, and 92. The three PF elements shown in
FIG. 2 may, for example only, correspond to PF elements 70,
72 and 74 in FIG. 1, and the three voters may correspond to
20, 22, and 24. In this example, dashed line 85 indicates that
configuration memory 83 is utilized to program configurable
logic block 84. Likewise, dashed line 132 indicates that con-
figuration memory 130 is utilized to program configuration
logic block 138. It is noted that dashed line 132 overlaps
configuration logic block 84. This overlap is for illustrative
convenience and serves no functional representation. Stated
otherwise, configuration memory 130 is not utilized to pro-
gram configuration logic block 84. Similarly, dashed line 134
is used to indicate that configuration memory 136 is utilized
to program configuration logic block 126. And, although
dashed line 134 overlaps both configuration blocks 84 and
138, these overlaps are for illustrative convenience only. In
general for all figures, such overlaps are for illustrative con-
venience only and serve no functional representation. Stated
otherwise, configuration block 136 is not utilized to program
configuration logic blocks 84 or 138.
Another PF element may comprise control logic block 126,
configuration memory 136 and flip/flop 128. This PF element
is also connected to voters 88, 90, and 92. Another PF element
may comprise configuration memory 130, CLB 138, and
flip/flop 140. This PF element also electrically connects to
voters 88, 90, and 92.
Voters 88, 90, and 92 are mode controlled voters as dis-
cussed hereinbefore. Mode control 142 is used to control the
voters and is applied to each of voters 88, 90, and 92 as
indicated by dashed line 144. In this case, when mode control
142 is a logic zero, then the programmable function elements
operate in the split mode of operation. When mode control
142 is a logic one, then the programmable function elements
operate in a majority voted mode, which in this case is also a
TMR mode of operation.
In TMR operation, feedback 94 may be utilized to provide
correction information for the PF elements when so directed
by local programmable routing network 96. Numeral 96 rep-
resents configuration bits and switches and conductors for a
local programmable routing network such as local program-
mable routing networkA. This is comparableto FIG. 1, where
local programmable routing network A might be utilized for
directing feedback in TMR utilizing the voter output on line
76. This is also comparable to FIG. 5, where components 26,
38, 39 58, 59, 106 and 112 represented local programmable
routing network A.
As discussed previously, it will be understood that configu-
ration bit (CFG) 146 in FIG. 2 controls switch 148, as indi-
cated by dashed line 154. Switch 148 switches between con-
ductor 150 and conductor 152, as discussed previously in
connection with FIG. 5. It will also be understood that switch
148, CFG bit 146, conductors 150 and 152 represent any
number of switches, configuration bits and conductors. Local
PR networkA can then selectively be connected to conductor
18
94 (by switches not shown in FIG. 2) to direct conductor 94 to
other locations or to utilize conductor 94 as feedback for
correcting errors in associated PF element. Although local
programmable routing (PR) network B and C are not indi-
5 cated by dashed lines, their components are comparable to
that discussed directly above for local PR network A. Refer
also to the discussion of FIG. 5 for more details about local PR
network B and C routing.
Global PR network 98 may be utilized in split mode opera-
lo tion to connect various programmable function members
together and/or make other connections may be largely or
may be completely disconnected in TMR operation. FIG. 2
provides a different circuit level view of an embodiment of the
invention as compared to that shown FIG. 1 or FIG. 3. As
15 discussed in connection with FIG. S, it will be understood that
configuration bits, such as configuration bit 160, are utilized
to control particular switches, such as switch 156, as indi-
cated by dashed line 158. Further details of a possible global
network are discussed above in connection with FIG. 5.
20 In TMR mode of FIG. 2, all PF elements would be config-
ured identically and operate on identical data and the results
would be voted to eliminate errors. In split-mode operation
the PF elements may be configured differently, operate on
different data, and produce different results.
25 The flip flops (F/Fs), such as flip-flop 86, are updated on
every clock cycle. Therefore, no errors persist in them. Any
memory in the PF elements, such as configuration memory
83, which is not updated from the input data on each clock,
will require some method to protect that data, e.g., scrubbing,
30 error correcting codes, voting, re-synchronization, and the
like.
As discussed above in the background section, a PF ele-
ment does not have to comprise a CLB and one or more F/Fs
as shown in FIG. 2. For example a PF element may comprise
35 a digital signal processing (DSP) element. A DSP element
would operate in a similar manner, although the logic is more
complex, with a multiplier and an adder, and many flip flops.
In that case, every flip flop is updated on each clock and is
voted as shown.
40 If a PF element comprises a memory element, usually
called BRAM for block random access memory, then it would
contain memory that was not updated from the input data on
each cycle, and like the configuration memory, this would
45 have to be protected by other means.
If a PF element comprises a CPU element it would have
various state information, such as a program counter, an
instruction pipeline, and perhaps a cache, that would not be
freshly updated from input data on each clock. These memory
50 elements would have to be protected in some other way.
Normally, a CPU would be re-synchronized when it failed
a vote. It would go through some process to re-synchronize
itself with the other CPUs. This might be as simple, for
example, as flagging its cache and instruction pipeline as
55 invalid, so they would be reloaded. Resynchronization could
also be used with configuration memory or block RAM, if the
means were provided to accomplish it.
FIG. 3 shows a generalized view of PLD 10 with program-
mable routing network with partitioned safe routing intercon-
6o nected with any number of programmable function elements
100. FIG. 3 configuration memory and I/O may be provided
as part of programmable routing 102 and/or programmable
functional elements 100. As discussed above, programmable
function elements could comprise various elements such as,
65 but not limited to look up table (LUT) based CLBs, DSP
blocks, and/or the like. Programmable function elements
could also be BRAM elements and/or CPU elements, given
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the caveat above that their state memory would have to be 	 ing unit and circuit board costs significantly. Moreover, when
separately treated in any redundancy scheme. 	 TMR is needed the end users have lower development costs
Each wire in FIG. 3 could represent many wires. Program-	 because there is no need to implement TMR into firmware.
mable routing resource 102 could be any type of routing, 	 This also shortens the required design time.
which may or may not comprise routing resource 34 5	 The present inventionmight also beutilized in otherredun-
described above. Programmable routing resource 102 may be	 dant circuits. For example, in a dual redundant system instead
distributed around programmable function blocks 100. An	 of a triple redundant system. In this case, instead of a voter,
example of some carry or shift or other direct block to block 	 some means to latch or gate a state update only when both
data paths 104 are shown vertically. 	 inputs agree may be provided. In this case, the latch or gate
In summary of operation, as discussed above, the present io would operate as normally in a dual redundant mode, and
invention provides circuitry which operates in a redundant	 would separately latch or gate the inputs in a non-redundant
mode and in a split mode. In redundancy mode, the voters 	 mode.
produce an output corresponding to the majority of inputs	 While a few exemplary embodiments of this invention have
which agree. In the split mode, the voters select just one input 	 been described in detail above, a person skilled in the art will
and convey this to the output, ignoring the other Inputs. 	 15 readily appreciate that many modifications are possible in the
For fault tolerance, it is assumed that faults will occur 	 exemplary embodiments without materially departing from
within only one section of a voting group within one voting 	 the novel teachings and advantages of this invention.
cycle, and thus the fault can be eliminated by majority voting. 	 Accordingly, all such modifications are intended to be
Three voters are used when the type of redundancy is TMR, 	 included within the scope of this invention as defined in the
providing three values to the next voting group, and so on, 20 following claims. In the claims, any means-plus-function and
with the entire device triplicated. By changing the mode of 	 step-plus-function clauses are intended to cover the structures
operation of the voters, the sections can operate either in a 	 or acts described herein as performing the recited function
TMR mode or independently. 	 and not only structural equivalents, but also equivalent struc-
When CRB 12 is operated in a TMR mode of operation, as 	 tures. Thus, although a nail and a screw may not be structural
discussed hereinbefore, the programmable function elements 25 equivalents in that a nail employs a cylindrical surface to
of each domain are programmed identically. In split mode 	 secure wooden parts together, whereas a screw employs a
operation, this is not necessary. For instance, configuration 	 helical surface, in the environment of fastening wooden parts,
memory, as shown in FIG. 2, may be utilized to program the 	 a nail and a screw may be equivalent structures.
programmable function elements to perform different func-	 What is claimed is:
tions. However, when operated in TMR mode of operation the 30	 1. A reconfigurable integrated circuit, comprising:
programmable function elements of the three voting domains 	 a plurality of programmable functional elements operable
are programmed identically. When operated in split mode, 	 to be programmed to form at least one electronic circuit;
each PF element may perform different functions or may 	 a plurality of voters electrically connected to said plurality
cooperate with each other to provide an application. 	 of programmable functional elements; and
The present invention preferably allows all programmable 35	 a mode control operably connected to said plurality of
elements which must be independent, whether function	 voters for adjusting a SEU/SET tolerance of said at least
blocks or routing blocks, to be easily identified and placed in 	 one electronic circuit,
separated areas at the time the chip is designed. This organi- 	 whereby in a first mode of operation, said at least one
zation helps provide SEU/SET protection even with more 	 electronic circuit has a relatively lower SEU/SET toler-
densely packed modern designs of PLDs. With smaller fea-  40	 ance, and
ture sizes on chips that are presently available, multi-node 	 whereby in a second mode of operation, said at least elec-
upsets have become the issue of the day. In prior art densely 	 tronic circuit has a relatively higher SEU/SET tolerance.
packed devices, multi-node upsets cannot simply be avoided 	 2. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 1, further
by programming in redundancy via firmware. In presently 	 comprising a plurality of programmable routing networks
available integrated circuits, two items that a designer 45 operably connected to said plurality of programmable func-
attempts to provide as "independent' might be adjacent, and 	 tional elements and said plurality of voters.
might be upset by a single particle strike. In the present 	 3. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein
invention, components intended to be independent compo- 	 in said first mode of operation said plurality of programmable
nents are not "near" each other, as discussed hereinbefore. 	 functional elements are programmable for performing differ-
In accord with the TMR embodiment of the invention, 50 ent data processing functions.
when operatedinthe splitmode of operation, effectively three 	 4. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein
times the resources are available. Since the only cost of this 	 in said second mode of operation said plurality of program-
method is the voters (the constraints on the routing network	 mable functional elements are identically programmable to
are probably inconsequential), and since most of the chip may 	 operate in a triple redundant mode of operation.
be comprised of configuration memory, up to 90% or even 55	 5. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 1,
greater, the overhead of including the voters is small, possibly 	 wherein said plurality of voters is comprised of a first,
less than 5%.	 second, and third voter and wherein said plurality of
Hardware TMR saves at least one "logic level' over firm- 	 programmable functional elements is comprised of a
ware redundancy, providing hardware redundancy perfor- 	 first, second, and third programmable functional ele-
mance without sacrificing necessary capacity. At least two 60	 ment,
configuration bit errors are required to circumvent the voters, 	 wherein said first voter and said first programmable func-
so configuration memory does not have to be separately	 tional element are organized in a first voting domain,
voted.	 wherein said second voter and said second programmable
The reconfigurable design enables a PLD, such as a FPGA, 	 functional element are organized in a second voting
to serve broader applications. There is a lower manufacturing 65	 domain,
cost for end users. The higher capacity mode for the split- 	 wherein said third voter and said third programmable func-
mode operation allows smaller FPGAs for end users, reduc- 	 tional element are organized in a third voting domain,
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wherein said first, second, and third voters are operably
connected to said first, second, and third programmable
functional elements,
wherein in said first mode of operation said first, second,
and third programmable functional elements are pro- 5
grammable for performing different data processing
functions,
wherein in said second mode of operation said first, sec-
ond, and third programmable functional elements are
identically programmable to operate in a triple redun- 10
dant mode of operation, and
wherein said at least one electronic circuit can be in either
the said first mode of operation or the said second mode
of operation.
6. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 5, further 15
comprising a first, second, and third local programmable
routing network,
wherein said first, second, and third local programmable
routing networks are organized in said first, second, and
third voting domains, respectively,	 20
wherein said first, second, and third local programmable
routing networks are operably connected to said first,
second, and third programmable functional elements,
respectively.
7. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 6, further 25
comprising a global programmable routing network operably
connected to said first, second, and third local programmable
routing networks.
8. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 6, further
comprising a global programmable routing network operably so
connected to said first, second, and third local programmable
routing networks by a first, second, and third set of at least two
switches, respectively, and
wherein said first, second, and third set of at least two 35
switches are spaced apart by at least one micron relative
to each other.
9. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 1, further
comprising a plurality of blocks, wherein said plurality of
programmable functional elements and said plurality of vot-
ers are organized into said plurality of blocks, wherein each of 40
said plurality of blocks are sufficiently physically separated
from others of said plurality of blocks to prevent a single
SEU/SET causing an error in any two of said plurality of
blocks at the same time.
10. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 9, further 45
comprising each of said plurality of blocks being separated
from said others of said plurality of blocks by at least one
micron.
11. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 9, further 50
comprising a plurality of non-switchable electrical connec-
tions operably connected to a predetermined set of said plu-
rality of voters in said plurality of blocks.
12. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 9, further
comprising one or more switchable connections operably 55
connecting said plurality of blocks, each of said one or more
switchable connections comprising at least two switches.
13. The reconfigurable integrated circuit of claim 12,
wherein said at least two switches are spaced apartby at least
one micron.	 60
14. A method for making a reconfigurable integrated cir-
cuit, comprising the steps of
providing a plurality of programmable functional elements
which are operable to be programmed to form at least
one electronic circuit;
electrically connecting a plurality of voters to said plurality
of programmable functional elements; and
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electrically connecting a mode control to said plurality of
voters for adjusting a SEU/SET tolerance of said at least
one electronic circuit whereby in a first mode of opera-
tion said at least one electronic circuit has a relatively
lower SEU/SET tolerance and whereby in a second
mode of operation said at least one electronic circuit has
a relatively higher SEU/SET tolerance.
15. The method of claim 14, whereby in said first mode of
operation saidplurality of programmable functional elements
are selectively programmable to perform different functions.
16. The method of claim 14, whereby in said second mode
of operation said plurality of programmable functional ele-
ments are identically programmable to provide a triple redun-
dant mode of operation.
17. The method of claim 14, further comprising the step of
operably connecting a first set of three of said plurality of
voters to each of a first set of three of said plurality of pro-
grammable functional elements, and operably connecting a
second set of three of said plurality of voters to each of a
second set of three of said plurality of programmable func-
tional elements.
18. The method of claim 14, further comprising the step of
organizing said plurality of programmable functional ele-
ments and said plurality of voters into a plurality of blocks,
and providing that each block of said plurality of blocks is
sufficiently physically separated from others of said plurality
of blocks to prevent a single SEU/SET causing an error in two
blocks at the same time.
19. The method of claim 18, whereby each of said plurality
of blocks is at least one micron from others of said plurality of
blocks.
20. The method of claim 18, further comprising the step of
installing one or more switchable connections for operably
connecting said plurality of blocks such that each of said one
or more switchable connections comprise at least two
switches.
21. The method of claim 20, further comprising the step of
sufficiently physically separating said at least two switches
from each other to prevent a single SEU/SET causing an error
in said at least two switches at the same time.
22. A method for operating a reconfigurable integrated
circuit, comprising the steps of
providing a reconfigurable integrated circuit, comprising:
a plurality of programmable functional elements;
a plurality of voters electrically connected to said plu-
rality of programmable functional elements; and
a mode control operably connected to said plurality of
voters;
programming said plurality of programmable functional
elements to form at least one electronic circuit; and
setting said mode control connected to said plurality of
voters to adjust a SEU/SET tolerance of said at least one
electronic circuit, whereby in a first mode of operation
said at least one electronic circuit has a relatively lower
SEU/SET tolerance and in a second mode of operation
said at least one electronic circuit has a relatively higher
SEU/SET tolerance.
23. The method of claim 22, further comprising the step of
selecting an output from each of said programmable func-
tional elements without majority voting in said first mode of
operation.
65 24. The method of claim 22, further comprising the step of
majority voting outputs from each of said plurality of func-
tional elements in said second mode of operation.
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25. The method of claim 22, further comprising the step of
programming said plurality of programmable functional ele-
ments to perform two or more different functions in said first
mode of operation.
26. The method of claim 22, further comprising the step of 5
programming said plurality of functional elements identi-
cally when said second mode of operation is selected.
27. The method claim 22, further comprising the step of
operating said plurality of programmable functional elements
to provide a triple redundant mode of operation in said second io
mode of operation.
24
28. The method of claim 22, wherein said plurality of
programmable functional elements and said plurality of vot-
ers are organized into a plurality of blocks, and further com-
prising the step of:
selectively closing at least two switches for operably con-
necting any one of said plurality of blocks to another of
said plurality of blocks.
